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Introduction 
The economics of competition emphasizes the derivation of a firm’s demand for labor from the 
demand for its product. The product and the labor are assumed homogenous and final consumers 
search for the lowest price. Yet, in many markets the final good is not homogeneous and 
consumers care about both price and product quality. For instance, Baldwin and Harrigan (2010) 
argue that if consumers care enough about product quality, then goods with the highest observed 
prices can be those most in demand because their quality-adjusted price is lowest. Baldwin and 
Ito (2011) confirm strong consumer demand for quality and isolate that fully 50 to 60 percent of 
exports from four large European exporters (Germany, France, Britain, Italy) should be classified 
as "very high quality" goods. A diminution of quality for these goods results in lost sales to 
rivals. We argue that when a firm’s demand is highly sensitive to product quality, a derived 
demand for high quality inputs results. This derived demand includes demand for high quality 
labor. Specifically, we hypothesize that when firm demand is highly sensitive to product quality, 
the firm must provide more training to its employees. 
 The extent to which firms compete by lowering price or increasing quality depends on 
customer preferences and the nature of the good [Shaked and Sutton (1982), Shapiro (1983), 
Allen (1984), Banker et al. (1998), Chioveanu (2012)]. Yet, when sales are, indeed, highly 
sensitive to quality, firms will demand high quality inputs and the demand for labor quality 
seems likely to require substantial firm-provided training. Greater training (as opposed to 
additional education) allows each firm to teach about its unique processes, products, competitors 
and customers, suggesting a very tight connection between the extent of firm-sponsored training 
and demand sensitivity to product quality.  
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 Increased worker training as a response to needed product quality fits with the struggles 
firms actually face. The 2012 Foxconn strike in China revolved, in large part, around whether or 
not workers were provided with the training requisite for the exacting quality standards 
demanded by Apple [China Labor Watch (2012)]. 1  Similarly, Nike works explicitly with 
contractors in its supply chain to ensure that they ‘provide workers the skills and abilities needed 
to manage production’ and ‘to produce at the very highest quality’ [Nike (2014)]. More 
generally, researchers have examined "customer satisfaction" as a measure of product quality and 
argue that improving satisfaction requires substantial worker training as part of a successful 
management strategy [Rogg et al. (2001)]. Thus, in markets where firms regard their customers 
as highly sensitive to quality, worker training appears critical.  
 In what follows we present a model of oligopolistic competition in which the demand 
faced by each firm is sensitive to both prices and relative product quality. We assume that firm-
provided training enhances worker skills and thus increases product quality through, for example, 
improved workmanship and service. We characterize the optimal choices of price and training 
intensity and show that an increase in the sensitivity of demand to quality influences the profit-
maximizing level of training. This influence can be decomposed into two offsetting effects 
inherent in games with strategic substitutes. We demonstrate that the direct positive effect always 
dominates the negative strategic effect in a homogeneous industry and still prevails within broad 
parameter ranges when firms are heterogeneous. Thus, we hypothesize a positive relationship 
between training and the sensitivity of firm demand to relative quality.   
Our empirical analysis uses British workplace data. In cross section, panel and plausible 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations we show that the more important is product quality for 
                                                 
1 As of 2015, Apple Inc. was the world’s largest company by market capitalization and was also identified by Fortune in 2016 as 
the “world’s most admired company” based, in large part, on the quality of its products.  
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increasing demand, then the greater is the intensity of training. Our data source allows us to 
identify training specifically associated with quality control and to provide several alternative 
variable definitions that allow robustness tests. We also perform a counterfactual analysis that 
examines those firms for which demand is especially sensitive to price rather than to quality. The 
pattern across all of these tests suggests a genuine link between demand sensitivity to quality and 
the extent of training. Thus, we argue that employee training can improve product quality and 
firms that compete vigorously on quality to increase demand find such investments particularly 
profitable.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature to motivate our 
contribution. Section 3 sets out a theoretical framework implying that increased training may 
result from increased sensitivity of demand to relative product quality. Section 4 discusses our 
data and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents our empirical results and explores their 
robustness across different types of training and alternative variable definitions. Section 6 
collects final comments. 
 
Motivation and Related Literature  
Our hypothesized link between greater demand sensitivity to product quality and investments in 
worker training has generated only a modest sized past literature. This link can be seen as part of 
the broad theoretical view that producing quality products requires a ‘quality-transfer’ from 
inputs to output [Bacchiega and Minniti (2015)]. Such a view is reflected in work in international 
trade which assumes that country factor endowments in labor quality are key determinants of 
final product quality [see, for example, Keesing (1966), Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), Leamer 
(1984), Webster (1993), Oulton (1996), Schott (2004)]. In macroeconomics, Stokey (1991) 
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develops a dynamic model in which labor with more human capital produces higher quality 
goods so as to study the equilibrium growth rate of an economy. In the context of industrial 
economics, Gabszewicz and Turrini (1999, 2000) show theoretically that firms produce high or 
low quality goods depending respectively upon whether skilled labor is abundant or scarce. They 
imagine an endogenous supply of qualified labor but assume that workers alone choose whether 
to invest in human capital or remain unskilled.  
Empirical studies on the association between labor quality and product quality routinely proxy 
quality by price [Wolinsky (1983), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)]. Thus, they test whether firms 
producing higher priced products employ higher paid workers [see Abowd et al. (1996)]. More 
recently Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) provide new insights into the well-known pattern that 
larger plants pay higher wages. They confirm that larger plants both pay higher wages and charge 
higher product prices but they also demonstrate that larger plants use higher priced material 
inputs as well. They interpret this as evidence that larger plants produce higher quality products 
by employing higher quality inputs. Not examined in any of the studies on prices and wages is 
the extent to which quality labor is purchased or, instead, created through employer provided 
training. As far as we are aware, our study is the very first to investigate the relationship between 
endogenous firm-sponsored training, which creates labor quality, and the sensitivity of demand 
to final product quality. 
We recognize that the dimensions of quality may vary with the market and product.  Thus, speed 
of service may be critical in one setting - say delivery or fast food restaurants.  In another setting, 
reliability may be the critical quality dimension as in the provision of electricity. In other settings 
it may be the craftsmanship used in production, or the nature of interpersonal relationships. We 
do not try to isolate which dimensions matter in which settings.  Instead, our survey evidence 
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asks managers to examine their own product and identify the importance of “quality” relative to 
their rivals in determining demand for their product. Thus, we assume that in each setting the 
manager recognizes both the dimensions of quality that matter for their own product and the 
sensitivity of demand to that quality. 
 Given our contention that managers can determine the appropriate dimensions of quality, 
several methodological problems arise in attempting to identify an independent influence of 
demand sensitivity to quality on training. The first issue is including critical control variables. 
The prevailing, but not unanimous, view is that more competitive markets spur firms to improve 
product quality. In particular, firms increase quality if greater competition increases the elasticity 
of demand with respect to quality sufficiently more than the elasticity of demand with respect to 
price. 2  Thus, structural measures of competition could influence our independent variable 
measuring demand sensitivity to quality.   
At the same time an active literature argues for an association between structural product market 
competition and the dependent variable of training. Competition may reduce potential rents from 
training while simultaneously increasing the incentive for firms to innovate and thus train 
workers [Aghion et al. (2005)]. Competition may also affect a union’s bargaining power and its 
ability to negotiate over training [Boheim and Booth (2004)]. The empirical evidence remains 
very far from settled. Some studies find no relationship between competition and firm-sponsored 
training [Görlitz and Stiebale (2011), Picchio and Van Ours (2011)], whereas others find a 
positive correlation [Autor (2001), Lai and Ng (2014), Bassanini et al. (2007), Bassanini and 
Brunello (2011)]. More recent studies suggest a negative relationship [Bilanakos et al. (2017)] or 
even an inverse U-shaped relationship [Heywood et al. (2017)]. Two points are worth stressing 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the early work by Dorfman and Steiner (1954) and later work by Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992). For a 
review of the ambiguous relationship between competition and the quality, see Propper et al. (2008) and Brekke et al. (2018). 
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about this empirical literature.  First, none of the above studies examine the role that sensitivity 
to product quality plays in determining the extent of training. This role is the focus of our paper. 
Second, the literature does, however, make clear that a failure to control for such competition 
could generate omitted variable bias. As a consequence, we include structural competition 
measures. As we will show, the extent of such bias does not appear to be substantial in our data 
since estimations with and without such controls remain very similar. 
A second methodological issue is that our cross-section evidence that demand sensitivity to 
quality is associated with more extensive training could result from sorting. Unmeasured 
establishment characteristics could drive both, greater sensitivity to quality and intensified 
worker training. In response, we use panel data to hold constant establishment fixed effects and 
still show that greater demand sensitivity to quality remains associated with greater training 
intensity.  
A third concern is that despite using available relevant variables and controlling for 
establishment fixed effects, demand sensitivity to quality remains endogenous. We implement an 
instrumental variable strategy showing that both the cross-section and panel estimates remain 
robust. We also examine the training specifically associated with quality control and confirm the 
general pattern. We attempt to validate our measure of sensitivity to quality, explore alternative 
definitions and provide a series of robustness tests. We find a durable, consistent and sizeable 
positive relationship between the sensitivity of demand to quality and the intensity of firm-
sponsored worker training.  
Before turning to our model, we stress that our paper contributes to the broad literature 
examining the link between product quality and firm success [see, for example, Allen (1984), 
Shapiro (1983), Klein and Leffler (1981), Kranton (2003) and Matsa (2011)] as well as to the 
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literature focusing on the determinants of employer-provided training [Booth and Snower (1996), 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999), Stevens (1994, 2001), Leuven (2005)].  We enrich these 
literatures by exploring the independent role demand sensitivity to quality plays in determining 
employers’ training investment. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
3.1 Setup 
We consider an oligopolistic industry with two firms (indexed by i=1,2) producing a good that is 
both horizontally and vertically differentiated. The price and quality of good i are pi and si 
respectively. We investigate how the sensitivity of demand to relative quality influences training 
incentives. We build on Banker et al. (1998) who extended Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives 
(1984). Our contribution diverges from previous work by its explicit assumption that the demand 
faced by firm i depends on prices and relative quality. This assumption reflects our contention 
that the vast majority of a single firm’s increase in demand associated with improving quality 
comes from taking customers away from rivals rather than from bringing new customers to the 
industry. This choice also has the advantage of providing an extremely close match to critical 
questions in our data.  Thus, we model demand: 
 
       ( )i i j i jq p p s sD E J O     , , 1, 2 , i j i j z          (1) 
 
where 0E J! ! (i.e. goods are imperfect substitutes) and 0O ! represents the sensitivity of 
demand for good i to an improvement of its quality relative to the quality of good j. The marginal 
production cost for both firms is 0c ! . Each firm i chooses the level of training, iI , to provide 
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its workforce at a cost given by the function 2( ) / 2i ig I IG , where 0G ! . As in Bacchiega and 
Minniti (2015), the quality of the good offered by firm i depends on the skill level of its 
workforce as determined by the amount of training ( i is I ). For expositional simplicity, we 
assume that workers receive a constant wage equal to their reservation wage that is normalized to 
zero.3 Therefore, the profit of firm i is: 
 
      ( ) ( )i i i ip c q g IS               (2) 
3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
The game between the two firms unfolds as follows. In stage 1, both firms simultaneously choose 
their training levels (thus also determining their brand qualities) and in stage 2 they set prices in a 
Bertrand-style sub-game. The equilibrium is derived through backward induction. 
In stage 2, each firm i sets ip  so as to maximize iS  subject to the demand function in (1), 
implying the reaction functions: 
 
        
( )
( )
2
j i j
i j
c p s sp p D E J OE
              (3) 
Solving this system yields the second-stage equilibrium prices, Bip , which can then be used to 
deduce the associated quantities, Biq , and profits, BiS : 
 
      
2( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ]( , , ) ,  ,  ( )
2 2 2 2
B
i j i jB B B i
i i i i
s s s s qa c cp q g IO OE D E JS EE J E J E J E J E
§   ·§ ·     ¨ ¸¨ ¸   © ¹© ¹     
(4)  
 
                                                 
3 The addition of workers’ participation constraints or the introduction of an explicit wage bargaining stage does not 
qualitatively affect the results of the model. 
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In stage 1, each firm i chooses the training level iI  so as to maximize BiS by taking into account 
that i is I . Under the concavity condition 2 22 / (2 )G G EO E Jt   , the reaction functions now 
are:  
 
      2 2
2 (2 )[ ( ) ]( ; )
(2 ) 2 2i j j
cI I IEO E J D E JO OG E J EO E J
ª º    « »  ¬ ¼
                  (5) 
 
where / 0i jI Iw w   implies that firms’ training decisions are strategic substitutes [Bulow et al. 
(1985)]. Solving this system yields the (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium levels of 
training: 
 
       * 2 2
2 [ ( ) ]
(4 )i
cI OE D E JG E J
                          (6) 
 
The relationship between training and sensitivity of demand to product quality is summarized in 
the following Proposition.4 
 
Proposition. Increasing sensitivity of demand to relative product quality increases training: 
* / 0iI Ow w ! for all 0O ! . 
 
The intuition behind this result can be better understood by inspecting the Nash equilibrium 
condition: 
 
        * *( ) ( ( ); )i i jI I IO O O             (7) 
                                                 
4 The specification of demand functions in (1) implies that, when firms are identical and therefore the equilibrium is 
symmetric, training investment and the associated quality choices do not ultimately affect the level of sales. Despite 
this apparent paradox, the definition of Nash equilibrium itself guarantees that the profile of training strategies 
specified in (6) is stable. Each firm selects its optimal response to the strategy of its competitor and cannot benefit 
from unilateral deviation. The case of heterogeneous firms (resulting in an asymmetric equilibrium) is examined in 
the Online Appendix. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
10 
 
 
Differentiation of (7) implies: 
 
        
** ( ; ) ( ; )i j i j ji
j
DE SE
I I I I dIdI
d I d
O O
O O O
w w  w w
          (8) 
 
As shown by the last equation, an increase in λ has an overall impact on *iI  that can be 
decomposed into two opposing effects typically present in games with strategic substitutes [see 
Roy and Sabarwal (2010)]. The first term on the right-hand side of (8) represents a positive direct 
effect (DE) that tends to increase firm i’s equilibrium training strategy by increasing its best 
response to a given strategy chosen by its competitor (firm j). The second term is a negative 
strategic effect (SE) through which an increase in λ also tends to increase the equilibrium strategy 
of firm j, thus having an adverse effect on i’s training decision due to strategic substitution. In 
our symmetric formulation, we have: 
 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 (2 )[ ( ) ] 4 [ ( ) ]
(2 )[ (2 ) 2 ] (4 )[ (2 ) 2 ]
c cDE SEE E J D E J E O D E JE J G E J EO G E J G E J EO
     !       
                (9) 
Since the direct effect always dominates the strategic effect, any increase in the dependence of 
product demand on relative quality strengthens the firms’ training incentives, as stated in the 
above Proposition.  
In the following sections, our empirical analysis examines this theoretical prediction. While our 
theoretical model is stylized, it makes clear the association between training and demand 
sensitivity to quality. In the on-line Appendix we have generalized the above model to allow for 
a cost asymmetry between the two firms. Critically, the positive relationship between training 
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and demand sensitivity to quality still holds within broad parameter ranges giving us further 
support as we turn to the empirical estimation. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Methodology  
We draw data from the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS). These surveys 
provide large scale, statistically reliable information about a broad range of employment 
practices across the British economy. We use the 2004 and 2011 cross-sections and a smaller 
panel survey across those years.   
4.1  WERS Data  
The 2004 and 2011 cross-sections represent the fifth and sixth instalments of a Government-
funded survey series of British workplaces. The sample comes from a random draw of the 
Interdepartmental Business Register, generally considered to be the highest quality UK sampling 
frame. The surveys are stratified by workplace size and industry with larger workplaces and 
some industries overrepresented [Kersley et al. (2006)]. As a consequence, we routinely use 
establishment weights to be representative of the sampling population.  We rely primarily on the 
‘Management Questionnaire’ (a face-to-face interview with the most senior manager who has 
day-to-day responsibility for personnel matters) as it provides information on training and on the 
extent of product/service quality competition, thus allowing us to construct a panel dataset. This 
critical question on quality competition was not asked prior to the 2004 survey. We utilise the 
‘Employee Questionnaire’ for robustness checks and associated variable construction. The 
survey population includes all British workplaces except private households and those in primary 
industries.  
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 The response rates for 2004 and 2011 are 64% and 46%, yielding 2295 and 2680 
establishments respectively. The decline in response rates reflects prevailing trends in business 
surveys [see van Wanrooy et al. (2013)]. We limit attention to establishments that trade 
externally by providing goods and services to the general public and/or to other organizations. 
This excludes establishments that trade internally or are administrative offices. We also drop 
observations with missing data on training or product quality competition. The resulting sample 
sizes are 1554 and 1688 establishments for 2004 and 2011 respectively. The 2011 WERS 
followed a subset of workplaces that also participated in the 2004 survey. After our sample 
restrictions, we retain a panel of 439 establishments (878 observations) observed in both 2004 
and 2011.  
 The surveys are attractive as they identify training intensity and the relative importance of 
product quality in determining demand while also providing a wide range of controls for the 
nature of the workforce, occupational composition and employer characteristics. The two cross-
sections allow us to follow the hypothesized relationship over time and the panel element allows 
us to remove time invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.   
 The core measure of training intensity asks managers if experienced employees in the 
largest non-managerial occupational group were given time off from their normal daily work 
duties to undertake training over the past 12 months. If managers answered yes, then they were 
subsequently asked: ‘If any training, on average, how many days of training did experienced 
employees in the largest non-managerial occupational group undertake over the past 12 
months?’ Managers are provided with a six-scale option on which to code their responses. The 
options are ordinal: ‘No time’ (1), ‘Less than one day’ (2), ‘1 to less than 2 days’ (3), ‘2 to less 
than 5 days’(4), ‘5 to less than 10 days’(5), and ‘10 days or more’(6). All establishments which 
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responded that they did not provide training are identified as ‘No time’. Appendix Table A1 
provides the distribution of responses and shows the variation of training intensity across 
establishments, a pattern that is reasonably stable over time. In the 2004 survey around the same 
percentage of establishments (almost fourteen percent) provided ‘No time’ and ‘10 days or 
more’. Training duration, as opposed to participation, fits more closely with our theoretical 
measure of training intensity and is typically recognized as a stronger indicator of skill formation 
[Green et al. (2013)].         
 Managers identify the demand sensitivity to quality by responding to the following 
question: ‘If in the trading sector and trading externally, to what extent would you say that the 
demand for your (main) product or service depends upon offering better quality than your 
competitors?’ Managers provide an ordered response from 1. ‘Demand does not depend at all on 
quality’ to 5. ‘Demand depends heavily on superior quality’. Appendix Table A2 provides the 
distribution of responses, again showing variation across establishments but a stable pattern 
between surveys. While five per cent or less of the managers responded that ‘Demand does not 
depend at all on quality’, approximately forty three per cent said that ‘Demand depends heavily 
on offering superior quality’. In what follows we identify these five categories as ‘Quality 
Importance 1’ through ‘Quality Importance 5’. 
 This survey question appears very closely aligned with the crucial parameter (λ) of the 
theoretical model as it measures the dependence of demand on relative brand quality. At best, the 
responses should proxy the establishment level sensitivity of demand to product quality with 
larger numbers reflecting greater demand sensitivity. At worst, the responses still provide the 
managers’ perspective on the extent to which quality improvements generate a competitive 
advantage.  
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 Importantly, this managerial perception contains valuable information as we show it 
closely reflects the objective characteristics of the establishment with regard to product quality. 
The surveys indicate: (1) whether or not the strategic plan of the establishment includes 
maintaining and improving product quality; (2) whether detailed records of product quality are 
kept; and (3) whether product quality measures are routinely targeted. Table 1 shows that as the 
main sensitivity of demand measure increases from 1 to 5, the likelihood of each of these 
objective characteristics increases monotonically. Managers who perceive greater sensitivity tend 
to work in establishments with greater activity and expenses oriented toward generating high 
quality.5 Thus, we argue that exploring the relationship between the intensity of training and the 
ordered managerial response sheds light on whether or not firms use training to ‘transfer quality’ 
from labor inputs to output. We will return in robustness checks to the potential concern that this 
managerial response may be overly subjective. 
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 In examining the relationship between training intensity and the sensitivity of demand to 
product quality we control for an extensive set of covariates. We describe this process in the next 
subsection and note that the descriptive statistics for all covariates used in the analysis are 
reported in Table OA1 in the on-line Appendix.   
4.2 Empirical Methodology 
Since the dependent variable is an underlying continuous variable where we only observe an 
indicator for a particular range, we initially estimate an ordered probit model. This categorical 
measure of training intensity depends on the importance of sensitivity to demand quality and on 
                                                 
5 Indeed, probit estimates including a large list of establishment characteristics show that the manager's perception of 
the importance of quality continues to be a significant correlate with each of the above three product quality 
activities. These estimates are available upon request. 
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suitable controls. We begin with cross-sectional estimates for each of the two years. In a baseline 
estimate we start with a specification containing more nearly exogenous controls but show that 
the critical results change little by substantially increasing the number and variety of control 
variables. The first specification includes controls for the workforce and occupational 
composition of the establishment. We include controls for the percentage of female employees 
[Green and Zanchi (1997)], the percentage of part time employees, the age structure and the 
share of the workforce in each of eight occupational groups [Brunello and De Paola (2008)].6 We 
also add seven dummy variables identifying the largest non-managerial occupational group in the 
establishment as well as industry and region dummies to capture variation of training across 
industries and regions. We show that in both cross sections those establishments which face a 
higher sensitivity of demand to product quality offer more training.        
 After examining the magnitude of the relationship between training intensity and demand 
sensitivity to quality, we expand our control variables to show the robustness of our results. 
Vives (2008) makes clear that the nature of competition influences workplace innovation and so 
may itself influence several of our controls. These controls may be correlated with both the 
demand sensitivity dummy variables as well as the extent of training. Thus, the stability of our 
estimates is important as it reduces the probability that our results suffer from omitted variable 
bias.  
 In adding controls, we take into account that there may be substantial fixed costs in 
establishing formal training and that large establishments can spread out these costs across many 
workers [Black et al. (1999)]. Moreover, such formal training programs may take time to develop 
                                                 
6 We recognize that the influence of some of these variables have been shown to involve important interactions. For 
instance, Picchio and Van Ours (2016) show that the influence of part-time status varies by gender. Our initial 
estimates did not confirm such an interaction but we lack their individual level data. Moreover, it seems unlikely to 
us that such interactions would be critical in generating omitted variable bias. 
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and may reflect the permanence and scope of the establishment. Thus, we control for the (log) 
number of employees and for whether the establishment is part of a larger organization (i.e. 
multi-establishment) or a single independent establishment (omitted category: sole UK 
establishment of a foreign organization). In this estimate we also add the percentage of 
employees who are trade union members [Boheim and Booth (2004)].7       
 In the third estimate we retain all the controls from the previous estimates and add the 
number of competitors faced by the establishment, i.e. few (less than 5) or many competitors 
(omitted category: none, establishment dominates the market). This reflects previous empirical 
work suggesting that a more concentrated product market increases the profitability of training 
investment [Bilanakos et al. (2017)].  In Appendix Table A3 we show that the relationship 
between structural competition and quality sensitivity may not be as strong in our data as 
anticipated by the literature. The lowest level of sensitivity to quality does seem to be 
concentrated in the establishments with the least competition. Yet, the distribution of sensitivity 
across the remaining four levels of sensitivity does not show a pronounced pattern. 
 Since the respondent manager is responsible for human resource issues and might not be 
best placed to assess product quality, we add two dummy variables capturing the gender of the 
manager and whether the respondent manager is the owner of the firm [Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007a, 2007b)]. The fifth estimate simply reproduces the fourth but uses OLS and treats training 
as a cardinal count value from 0 to 5. We do this both to get a quick estimate of the associated 
magnitudes and, more importantly, to set the stage for panel and instrumental variable estimates 
that necessarily rely on linear estimates.  
                                                 
7 There are three continuous variables with a large number of missing observations. These include the percentage of 
employees in the age groups 18-21 and above 50 as well as the percentage of employees who are trade union 
members. Instead of dropping important information by deleting these observations listwise, we have replaced 
missing observations with zeros and added in our specification respective dummy variables for the missing 
observations.     
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  We estimate all specifications for both cross-sections.8 Using the panel, we estimate 
analogous fixed-effect ordered probit models [Greene and Henscher (2010)]. The fixed-effect 
ordered probit model holds constant time invariant characteristics of the establishment but brings 
with it an incidental parameter problem. We therefore provide three alternative fixed effect 
estimation techniques that each confirm the pattern of results and are not subject to the incidental 
parameter problem.  
 We also recognize that the critical independent variable measuring the sensitivity of 
demand to quality might be endogenous. In response, we utilize an industrial aggregation 
technique [Fisman and Svensson (2007), Lai and Ng (2014)] to generate a plausible instrumental 
variable strategy. The available diagnostics seem reassuring and both the cross-section and the 
fixed effect results persist in instrumental variable estimates. 
 
5. Empirical Results  
5.1 Ordered Probit Analysis 
The first column of Table 2 presents the baseline estimate of the determinants of training 
intensity in 2004. The coefficients on the sensitivity of demand to quality importance are positive 
and monotonically increase, suggesting that establishments engage in more training as demand 
becomes more sensitive to quality. Moreover, the two categories that indicate the greatest 
importance for sensitivity to quality have the largest coefficients and are significant, implying 
                                                 
8 In robustness tests we also utilise the employee questionnaire in WERS to construct the average education of the 
establishment’s workforce [i.e. the percentage of the workforce with: GCSE (grades D-G), GCSE (grades A-C), ‘A’-
levels, first degree (BSc, BA), higher degree (MSc, MA, PhD) and other academic qualifications (omitted category: 
percentage of employees with no academic qualifications)]. We merge these establishment level variables into the 
management questionnaire using the unique establishment identifier. The reason we do not include these variables in 
the main sample is that they substantially reduce sample sizes. We lose 405 observations in the 2004 sample and 510 
observations in the 2011 sample. When adding these variables to the fourth specification, the estimated coefficients 
on quality importance retain their magnitude. These results are reported in the on-line Appendix Table OA2.   
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that training intensity is above that in establishments that demand with no sensitivity to product 
quality. Column 1 also shows that establishments with higher percentages of part-time employees 
and employees over 50 years of age train less intensively [Booth (1991)]. In contrast, those 
establishments with a higher number of young employees train more intensively.   
     Column 2 adds firm characteristics as well as the percentage of employees who are trade 
union members and shows that the magnitude of estimated coefficients for the two higher 
demand sensitive to quality categories presented in column 1 remains almost the same. The 
estimates also indicate that establishments train more intensively if they have more employees 
and if more of their employees are union members. In contrast, single independent 
establishments train less.      
<<Table 2, around here>> 
 In column 3 we add two indicators capturing the number of competitors faced by the 
establishment. These estimates show that establishments facing a higher number of competitors 
train less intensively. This result matches Bilanakos et al. (2017), who find that dominant firms 
invest in more training, and fits earlier evidence showing a broadly positive relationship between 
industrial concentration and measures of labor quality [Belman and Heywood (1990)]. Including 
the new controls does not alter the coefficients on the measures of sensitivity of demand to 
product quality importance.  
 The final estimate adds indicators of the respondent manager’s characteristics. The gender 
of the manager does not affect training intensity, but those establishments where the manager is 
also the owner do offer less training. This fits Bloom and Van Reenen (2007a, 2007b) who argue 
that owners might be poor managers, especially when firms are inherited [see also Caselli and 
Gennaioli (2013)]. However, this new relationship does not fundamentally change the role of 
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demand sensitivity to product quality. Indeed, if anything, the coefficients of the two higher 
demand sensitivity categories increase in magnitude while retaining the monotonic relationship 
with training intensity. Throughout all these specifications, the estimated coefficients of ‘Quality 
Importance 4’ and ‘Quality Importance 5’ in column 4 are significantly different from the 
estimated coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 2’ and ‘Quality Importance 3’, but are not 
statistically different from each other. 
 Using these estimates from column 4, we compute the average marginal effects where 
dummy variables are set at zero and continuous variables are set at their means. These reveal that 
indicating ‘Quality Importance 4’ decreases the probability of being in the lowest training 
category by 0.161 while indicating ‘Quality Importance 5’ reduces that probability by 0.227. 
Similarly, indicating ‘Quality Importance 4’ increases the probability of being the highest 
training category by 0.111 while indicating ‘Quality Importance 5’ increases that probability by 
0.154. Column 5 presents OLS estimates and largely confirms the evidence from the ordered 
probit suggesting that the highest sensitivity category is associated with an increase of 0.31 of a 
training intensity category relative to the lowest sensitivity category.       
 In Table 3 we reproduce the series of estimates using the 2011 cross-section. The pattern 
of significant controls remains very similar. Critically, the role of demand sensitivity to quality 
very closely mimics that in the 2004 survey. All coefficients across all specifications are positive 
and increase monotonically in magnitude. Adding the controls again appears to strengthen the 
relationship. Across all columns the coefficients for the two categories indicating the greatest 
sensitivity to quality take the largest values and are all significantly different from zero - recall 
that no importance for quality is the excluded category. The magnitude of the results appears to 
have grown as shown by the larger OLS coefficients in 2011 than in 2004 and as confirmed by 
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larger marginal effects for the ordered probit in 2011. A full set of marginal effects are available 
for both years and all specifications in the on-line Appendix Table OA3.  
<<Table 3, around here>> 
5.2 Panel Estimates  
Table 4 moves to a balanced panel of 439 establishments observed in both 2004 and 2011.  
Summary statistics in Tables A1 and A2 suggest that these establishments match the distribution 
of training and the importance of product quality found in the cross-sections. They also broadly 
match the other characteristics of the establishments reported for the two cross-sections in the on-
line Appendix Table OA1.   
 The fixed effect estimates are identified by those establishments that change their 
evaluation on the importance of demand sensitivity to product quality. The number of such 
changes is sufficiently high over the seven years to derive meaningful estimates. Of the 439 
establishments in the panel, 268 changed their evaluation on the importance of sensitivity with 
133 increasing and 135 decreasing their evaluation.9 
 
<<Table 4, around here>> 
We first present a pooled estimate without establishment fixed effects but on the panel sample. 
These results are presented in column 1 and reveal the familiar pattern of establishments training 
more if reporting that demand depends heavily on product quality. As was evident in the two 
cross sections, the coefficients increase monotonically in magnitude as the sensitivity of demand 
to quality becomes higher. The point estimates of the two higher quality importance variables are 
comparable to the two earlier cross-section estimates, suggesting that the establishments in the 
                                                 
9 This is matched by similar variation in training intensity, with 161 establishments reporting greater intensity and 
155 establishments reporting reduced intensity. 
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panel are not an unusually selected sample. As an example, moving from an establishment where 
sensitivity to product quality has no importance to either of the two highest categories of 
importance greatly influences the probability of offering training of ‘10 days or more’. The 
probability increases by 7 percentage points as compared to 4 percentage points in the 2004 
sample and 5 percentage points in the 2011 sample.  
As in the two cross sections, we also present results from an OLS model in the pooled sample. 
The estimates in column 2 show that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the two higher demand 
sensitivity categories are larger in magnitude than the respective cross-sectional estimates. 
However, the monotonic relationship with training intensity remains.       
 Column 3 presents the results from a fixed effects ordered probit model on the same 
panel. The point estimates are generated by the within establishment variation in quality 
competition and present the closest analogue to the ordered probits presented for the two cross-
sections. The relevance of the incidental parameter problem and the advantages and limitations of 
the fixed-effect ordered probit are discussed in Greene (2001) and Greene and Henscher (2010). 
The point estimates suggest that establishments provide more training as they move from a lower 
to a higher category of sensitivity of demand with quality. The point estimates change modestly 
(compared to the pooled estimate on the same sample) as a result of the fixed effect estimates. 
Yet, to the extent that unmeasured time invariant characteristics influence the cross-section 
estimates, they do not seem to generate a routine upward bias.   
 We next alter the functional form of our fixed effect estimate and present results from an 
OLS fixed effects model. Column 4 shows that the estimated coefficients are higher in magnitude 
than the cross-section equivalents and retain their monotonic behaviour as well as their statistical 
significance.  
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   As described above, the dependent variable measuring training intensity is grouped into 
intervals as the duration falls into one of six categories. Therefore, a variant of the ordered probit 
is the interval regression model that allows for truncation beyond the maximum number of 
training days (10 days). Thus, we estimated the cross-section and panel results (with and without 
establishment fixed effects) using interval regression by constructing an upper and lower 
threshold of training and setting the truncated number of training days to be 10. The results 
strongly persist with monotonically increasing coefficients on the sensitivity variables and the 
highest two categories attaining coefficients statistically different from zero. These results are 
reported in the on-line Appendix Table OA4. Thus, in line with the ordered probit fixed effects 
and the OLS fixed effects, the interval regression results provide no indication that the cross-
sectional findings result from time invariant establishment specific effects.10 
 
5.3 Robustness: Three Extensions  
In this subsection we present three extensions to examine the robustness of the relationship 
between training and the competitive importance of quality. We start by noting that training can 
be important for implementing quality control procedures. Thus, if demand is highly sensitive 
product quality, establishing such control procedures can be critical in both manufacturing and 
service [Zeithamal (2000)]. The effective operation of quality control systems involves 
substantial training both initially and throughout the employment relationship [Lynch and Black 
(1998)]. We examine whether the role of sensitivity of product demand to quality remains 
significant in determining both the targeted training associated with quality control systems and 
other training not directly associated with such systems. 
                                                 
10 Recently Baetschmann et al. (2015) have shown that by using a specific data transformation, the fixed effects 
ordered logit model will not suffer from the incidental parameter problem. We have also estimated this variant 
(available upon request) and it generates the same pattern yet again.  
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 The critical question asks those firms that provide training if this is done for quality 
control procedures or for reasons other than quality control. These are not mutually exclusive as 
in both surveys around 39 per cent of establishments provide both types of training. We use the 
training intensity provided from the original question to produce separate estimates by type of 
training. Thus, in the estimate for quality control training, the non-zero value of training intensity 
is used only if the firm provides such training.  
The estimates for both the 2004 and 2011 cross-sections demonstrate a familiar pattern. The 
more important demand sensitivity to product quality is, the more intensive is worker training. 
This remains true both for training on quality control systems and for other types of training. 
While these cross-section estimates are presented in the on-line Appendix Table OA5, we now 
show the equivalent panel estimates. 
 
<<Table 5, about here>> 
The estimates show a strong positive relationship for the pooled estimate that broadly matches 
the cross-sections, indicating that the movers are not an unusually selected sample. The 
relationship also persists in both fixed effect estimates as shown in columns 3 and 6.  The 
coefficient estimates are larger for the individual types of training than for the general measure in 
Table 4. Nonetheless, it remains true that the two categories of greatest importance are 
statistically significant in the fixed effect estimate for quality control training. Thus, this critical 
type of training becomes more intense when a given establishment faces an increased sensitivity 
of demand to product quality. Unmeasured but time invariant differences in establishments do 
not drive the relationship between the demand sensitivity measures and training for quality 
control procedures. The results for other types of training are broadly similar - with 
monotonically increasing positive coefficients - but here the fixed effect estimates for the 
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categories 2 and 3 also emerge as weakly significant. While the survey structure does not allow 
us to determine the true intensity for each type of training (they are not mutually exclusive), this 
finding remains consistent with both types of training responding to the importance of demand 
sensitivity to quality. 
 The second robustness check returns to the concern that the critical independent variable 
on quality competition might reflect subjective judgement. While we have demonstrated that the 
responses correlate with actual quality oriented activities in the firm, one might contend that 
managers simply inflate the importance of demand sensitivity to quality. Alternatively, managers 
might view their product as successful regardless of its quality so that those with high quality 
products report demand sensitivity is important and those with low quality products report 
demand sensitivity is not important.  
 As a way to address these concerns, we exploit another question posed to the managers: 
“How does your product quality compare to others in your industry?” We include the ordered 
responses as additional controls in the estimates. We do this under the assumption that the 
managerial responses to this new question may reflect similar reporting bias as the responses to 
the original question. If so, including the responses to the new question may help hold constant 
the bias in the original question.  
 
<<Table 6 about here>> 
 Table 6 shows the ordered probit for both cross-sections as well as for the panel and the 
panel controlling for fixed effects.11 The results indicate that all coefficients on product quality 
are positive and increase across categories. This suggests that the higher the reported quality, the 
higher is training. Yet, only one of the response categories ever reaches statistical significance 
                                                 
11Again, similar results are available for the fixed effect OLS and interval regression estimates. 
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and thus they do little to change the fundamental result. Training still appears to be driven by the 
sensitivity of demand to quality. Moreover, the pattern of results makes sense as a pure 
monopoly may have either high or low quality but will not feel the spur of competition on quality 
to increase training. More importantly, it is reassuring that our results do not appear, according to 
this test, to be largely driven by a reporting bias on the question concerning the competitive 
importance of quality that is correlated with training. 
 The third robustness exercise follows a related line of reasoning. If demand sensitivity to 
product quality is uniquely important for training, then we should be able to identify a set of 
firms that compete on other dimensions and find a very different pattern. In particular, WERS 
asks managers to report the importance of competing on price in an analogous format to our 
critical sensitivity to product quality variable. Thus, if stealing demand from rivals depends on 
low pricing, quality may be irrelevant or even harmful as it raises costs and so makes it more 
difficult to deal with price competition. Accordingly, there should be no or even a negative 
relationship with training, a costly investment in inputs designed, in part, to improve output 
quality. We view this exercise as a counterfactual analysis where firms compete on prices rather 
than on product quality.  
 
<<Table 7 about here>> 
 Table 7 uses exactly the same specification that we have been examining but replaces the 
ordered sensitivity to quality responses with the ordered importance of price sensitivity. The 
results are dramatic with each coefficient taking a negative value and with the absolute size of 
those negative coefficients growing monotonically with the importance of competing on price. In 
the cross-sections, the pooled sample and the fixed effect estimates, the greater levels of 
importance have the largest coefficients and are typically statistically significant.  This extends to 
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the fixed effect OLS and interval regression estimates, all of which are available upon request. 
Establishments that compete with rivals on price invest less in training. This seems a mirror 
image of our primary finding that sensitivity to product quality generates more training and so 
helps to confirm that finding. It is not the intensity of competition itself but rather the sensitivity 
of demand to quality that drives training. This also helps to support our view that our central 
results were not generated by a unique reporting bias to the question on sensitivity of demand to 
product quality. 
 
5.4     Endogeneity and IV Estimation  
Finally, we recognize that even given the estimations shown, endogeneity could undermine our 
interpretation. Despite our inclusion of many controls, some establishments may have products 
or consumer characteristics that make both quality competition and training more likely. Even in 
the fixed effect estimates there might be unmeasured factors that generate changes both in the 
extent of quality competition and in the intensity of training. To the extent that this argument is 
correct, it would require instruments that identify a source of independent variation in the quality 
competition variable. 
 While few instrumental variables are perfect, we adopt a strategy based on industrial 
aggregation [for examples see Fisman and Svensson (2007), Lai and Ng (2014)]. The strategy 
posits that there are characteristics of the product and its industry that help define the extent of 
sensitivity of demand to quality. These product and industry characteristics stand as exogenous 
influences that make it more or less likely that firms within the industry will have quality 
sensitive to demand. Simply put, a particular firm is unlikely to find quality important for 
competition if the other firms in its industry do not. At the same time, it is the individual firm’s 
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need to compete on quality, not that of its rivals, that can be anticipated to determine the 
individual firm’s training intensity.  
 The empirical implementation of this common strategy generates identifying variables 
that aggregate the quality importance measures. The aggregates (averaged to the proportion in 
each category) vary by establishment in the industry by excluding the establishment for which 
they are computed. Thus, the measure is the proportion in the category for other establishments 
in a given establishment’s industry.12  
 The estimation uses two stage least squares that treat training as a dependent cardinal 
count variable from 0 to 5. The first stage consists of four linear probability regressions where 
the dependent variable each time is the endogenous importance of demand sensitivity to quality 
variable (zero or one) against all the joint variables and the four aggregated industry proportions 
(instruments) for the quality importance categories [see Baltagi (2011) p.245]. The second stage 
returns the four estimated values from the first stage along with the joint variables to the 
midpoint estimates on training and clusters the standard errors at workplace cells.13  
<<Table 8 about here>> 
The results are shown in the three panels of Table 8. Panels A and B present the results for the 
two cross-sections. Columns 1 to 4 report the first stage results. As expected, in each of the first 
four columns the respective instrument strongly predicts the potentially endogenous variable. 
Thus, in column 3 of panel A where the dependent variable is ‘Quality Importance 4’, the 
instrument for ‘Quality Importance 4’ attains a large, positive and significant coefficient. 
                                                 
12 In order to generate enough observations per industry (especially in the panel) we aggregate establishments into 
eleven one-digit SIC industries: manufacturing, utilities (electricity, gas and water), construction, wholesale and 
retail, hotels and restaurants, transport and communication, financial services, other business services, education, 
health and other community services. Descriptive statistics of the industries are reported in Table OA1 in the online 
Appendix.        
13 Clustering standard errors at industry cells is problematic due to having only a small (eleven) number of industries 
[see Davidson and McKinnon (2008)].       
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Similarly, in column 4 of panel A where the dependent variable is ‘Quality Importance 5’, the 
instrument for ‘Quality Importance 5’ again attains a large, positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. All other instruments take insignificant coefficients. This pattern is reassuring and 
confidence is further reinforced by the absence of weak instruments [Bound et al. (1995) and 
Stock et al. (2002)]. An appropriate test for an exactly identified system is given by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) based on the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic. In each 
estimation our estimated statistic exceeds the 10.81 critical value for a model with four 
endogenous variables and four instruments.14              
 In each cross-section, the second stage shows the familiar monotonically increasing 
coefficients with the last two significantly different from zero. It is worth comparing the 
estimated magnitudes with those in the OLS. The cross-sectional estimates in column 5 of Tables 
3 and 4 are only modestly larger than the IV estimates in Panels A and B. This suggests the 
influence of endogeneity may itself be modest. We recognize this conclusion rests not only on 
the absence of weak instruments but on the independence assumption. The aggregate industry IV 
measure must be orthogonal to training intensity (conditional on the included controls) and so 
introduce independent variation in the establishment measure. While this assumption is not 
directly testable, we can informally include the aggregate industry measures in the OLS estimates 
in column 5 of Tables 2 and 3. The aggregated categorical responses take positive coefficients in 
both cross-sections but the coefficient sizes do not monotonically increase and none of these 
coefficients approaches even weak statistical significance.15   
                                                 
14 Stock and Yogo (2005) characterise instruments to be weak not only if they lead to biased IV estimates, but also if 
hypothesis tests of the IV parameters suffer from severe size distortions. The critical value of 10.81 reflects a Cragg-
Donald eigenvalue statistic for which a Wald test at the 5 percent level will have an actual rejection rate of no more 
than 10 percent.  
15 These estimates are available upon request. 
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 Panel C moves to the panel and combines the instrumental variable strategy with a fixed 
effect estimate. The monotonically increasing pattern of coefficients remains and the coefficient 
on the greatest level of importance retains statistical significance. The size of that coefficient falls 
between those estimated by IV in the two cross-sections (although closer to that in the 2004 
survey). Again, the test statistic exceeds the critical value suggesting the absence of weak 
instruments.  
 As a further robustness check we implement the Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) interval regression estimator proposed by Bettin and Lucchetti (2012). This 
estimator generalises the standard interval regression model to allow for the presence of 
endogenous regressors. While the estimator cannot easily incorporate workplace fixed effects, 
the focus on intervals is potentially important. It essentially examines whether by ignoring the 
underlying intervals in the training measure, the earlier results may be misleading. The results are 
reported in the on-line Appendix Table OA6 and return coefficients closely in line with those 
reported in Table 8. The coefficients for ‘Quality Importance 4’ and ‘Quality Importance 5’ 
remain large, ordered and statistically significant across all three datasets. If anything, the 
coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 4’ and ‘Quality Importance 5’ are larger than those in Table 
8. We find it reassuring that the fixed effect 2SLS estimator does not present a misleading picture 
by ignoring the underlying intervals.                             
 We again informally examine independence in the panel by including the aggregated 
instrumental variable measures directly into the single equation fixed effect estimate from Table 
4. The coefficients show no monotonically increasing pattern and are individually and jointly 
insignificant with an average p-value exceeding 0.6. Even though not a formal test, one would be 
concerned if the instrumental variables were evidently correlated with the dependent variable.  
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 As mentioned, few instrumental variable strategies are perfect but we take reassurance 
from these results as they reduce the likelihood that the previous estimates reflect endogeneity. 
Importantly, it remains evident throughout the estimates that establishments for which demand 
sensitivity to quality is more important engage in more training than those for which it is less 
important. 
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we present and test the hypothesis that an individual firm which faces demand 
highly sensitivity to product quality will train its workforce more intensively than one which 
does not. Training is, of course, not the only element of worker quality. Establishments might 
also simply hire more competent or better educated workers, or use both recruitment and training 
policies to affect the behaviour of their employees through their career concern incentives [Bar-
Isaac and Ganuza (2008)]. Worker quality is also not the only element of input quality. Yet, each 
establishment has a particular production process, particular non-labor inputs and, often, 
particular customers. Learning how to produce quality products in these circumstances seems 
likely to require very specific skills typically taught through training. Thus, we have been 
concerned with the large literature trying to explain the determinants of training and we 
emphasise the extent to which the establishment must compete on quality. 
 In our theoretical model we show that, when training investments improve product 
quality, an increase in the sensitivity of demand to relative quality will reinforce employers’ 
incentives to train their workforce. This emphasis of the model on demand sensitivity dovetails 
nicely with the WERS question which asks if demand for the main product or service depends 
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upon offering better quality than the competitors. We use this question to investigate our 
hypothesis. 
 In our empirical analysis we routinely find that establishments competing with greater 
demand sensitivity train more intensively. This is true in two establishment level cross-sections 
when including a very extensive set of sensible controls. And it also remains true in several 
variants of panel fixed effect estimates designed to hold constant time invariant establishment 
effects. 
 We conduct a series of robustness exercises that support our basic result. Each confirmed 
the of role demand sensitivity both for training on quality control procedures and for other types 
of training. It persists when holding constant the managers’ perception of their product quality 
which helps to convince us that the right focus should be on quality competition - i.e. the 
sensitivity of demand. In a counterfactual analysis we find nearly mirror opposite results showing 
that establishments that compete with rivals on price do less training, thus suggesting that the key 
determinant is not competition in itself but specifically competition on quality. Critically, the 
fundamental relationship still holds when implementing a plausible instrumental variable strategy 
to control for endogeneity.  
 We recognize limitations of our examination. First, the measure of sensitivity to quality 
remains the subjective view of the establishment’s manager. Yet, we have shown that this 
subjective measure is correlated with firms’ actual activities regarding quality that would seem 
far more objective. Further, controlling for the same managers’ perception of actual quality and 
examining the role of price competition provide further support to the idea that the subjective 
view of the manager contains valuable information. Second, we have used a measure of training 
intensity that may not fully capture the value of what is learned. It certainly does not include 
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informal training or learning by doing. Third, we recognize that an alternative study focusing on 
individual workers might hold constant individual worker effects and generate different results. 
Despite these imperfections, it seems sensible that product market characteristics are crucial 
determinants of training investments and that the intensity of quality competition should be 
among those determinants. Our robust evidence confirms this relationship and represents an 
important initial contribution on which further work can build. 
 Finally, our work fits with the broad idea that firms competing on quality will make use 
of high quality inputs as part of this competition. High quality materials and physical inputs are 
purchased in markets. Indeed, even more educated workers can be purchased in a market as 
mentioned. Yet, training seems to be a critical element of worker quality that is often provided by 
the firm itself and so more targeted to unique firm specific elements of quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
33 
 
References 
 
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F. and Moreau, A. (1996) ‘Product Quality and Worker Quality’ Annales d'Économie et de 
Statistique 41/42, 299-322. 
 
Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J. S. (1998) ‘Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113, 79-119.   
 
Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.S. (1999) ‘Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets’ Economic Journal 
109, 112–142. 
 
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Howitt, P. (2005) ‘Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U 
Relationship’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 701 – 728. 
 
Allen F. (1984) ‘Reputation and Product Quality’ Rand Journal of Economics 15, 311-327.  
 
Autor, David, H. (2001) ‘Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?’ Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 116, 1409-1448. 
 
Bacchiega, E. and Minniti, A. (2015) ‘Training and Product Quality in Unionized Oligopolies’ Economica 82, 1261-
1301. 
 
Baetschmann, G., Staub, K.E. and Winkelmann, R. (2015) ‘Consistent Estimation of the Fixed Effects Ordered Logit 
Model’ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 178, 685-703.   
 
Baldwin, R. and Harrigan, J. (2010) ‘Zeros, Quality, and Space: Trade Theory and Trade Evidence’ American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, 60-88. 
   
Baldwin, R. and Ito, T. (2011) ‘Quality Competition Versus Price Competition Goods: An Empirical Classification’ 
Journal of Economic Integration 26, 110-135.    
 
Baltagi, B. H. (2011) Econometrics. New York: Springer.  
 
Banker, R. D., Khosla, I. and Sinha, K. K. (1998) ‘Quality and Competition’ Management Science 44, 1179-1192. 
 
Bar-Isaac, H. and Ganuza, J.J. (2008) ‘Recruitment, Training, and Career Concerns’ Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 17, 839-864.   
 
Bassanini, A., Booth, A., Brunello, G., De Paola, M., and Leuven, E. (2007) Workplace Training in Europe in G. 
Brunello, P. Garibaldi, and E. Wasmer (eds.), Education and Training in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
UK.  
 
Bassanini, A. and Brunello, G. (2011) ‘Barriers to Entry, Deregulation and Workplace Training’ European 
Economic Review 55, 1152-1176. 
 
Belman, D. and Heywood, J.S. (1990) ‘Market Structure and Labor Quality’ Journal of Industrial Economics 39, 
155-168. 
 
Bettin, G. and Lucchetti, R. (2012) ‘Interval Regression Models With Endogenous Explanatory Variables’ Empirical 
Economics 43, 475-498.  
  
Bilanakos, C., Green, C. P., Heywood, J. S. and Theodoropoulos, N. (2017) ‘Do Dominant Firms Provide More 
Training?’ Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 26, 67-95. 
   
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
34 
 
Black, D.A, Noel, B.J. and Wang, Z. (1999) ‘On-the-Job Training Establishment Size, and Firm Size: Evidence for 
Economies of Scale in the Production of Human Capital’ Southern Economic Journal 66, 82 – 100. 
 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J. (2007a) ‘Why do Management Practices Differ Across Firms and Countries’   
Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 203-224.  
 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J. (2007b) ‘Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and 
Countries’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 1351-1407. 
 
Boheim, R. and Booth, A. (2004) ‘Trade Union Presence and Employer-Provided Training in Greater Britain’ 
Industrial Relations: a Journal of Economy and Society 43, 520-544. 
 
Booth, A. L. (1991) ‘Job-Related Formal Training: Who Receives it and what is it Worth? Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 53, 281-294. 
 
Booth, A. and Snower, D. (1996) Acquiring Skills: Market Failures, their Symptoms and Policy Responses, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bound, J., Jaeger, D.A. and Baker, R.M. (1995) ‘Problems with Weak Instrumental Variables Estimation When the 
Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory variable is Weak’ Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 90, 443-450.   
 
Brekke, K. R., Siciliani, L., Straume, O.R. (2018) ‘Can Competition Reduce Quality?’ Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming. 
 
Brunello, G. and De Paola M. (2008) ‘Training and Economic Density: Some Evidence form Italian Provinces’  
Labour Economics 15, 118-140. 
 
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J. and Klemperer P. (1985) ‘Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and 
Complements’ Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511.  
 
Caselli, F. and Gennaioli, N. (2013) ‘Dynastic Management’ Economic Inquiry 51, 971-996. 
 
Chioveanu, I. (2012) ‘Price and Quality Competition’ Journal of Economics 107, 23-44. 
 
Cragg, H.G and Donald, S. G. (1993) ‘Testing Identifiability and Specification in Instrumental Variable Models’ 
Econometric Theory 9, 222-240.   
 
China Labor Watch (2012) ‘3000 to 4000 workers strike at Foxconn’s China factory’ October 12, 2012, 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/newscast/187 accessed August 25 2015. 
 
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J.G. (2008). ‘Bootstrap Inference in a Linear Equation Estimated by Instrumental 
Variables’ Econometrics Journal 11, 443-477.   
 
Dixit, A. (1979) ‘A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers’ Bell Journal of Economics 10, 20-32. 
 
Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954) ‘Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality’ American Economic Review 44, 
826-836.  
 
Dranove, D. and Satterthwaite, M.A. (1992) ‘Monopolistic Competition When Price and Quality are Imperfectly 
Observable’ Rand Journal of Economics 23, 518-534.   
 
Findlay, R. and Kierzkowski, H. (1983) ‘International Trade and Human Capital: A Simple General Equilibrium 
Model’ Journal of Political Economy 91, 957-978.  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
35 
 
Fisman, R. and Svensson, J. (2007) ‘Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence’ 
Journal of Development Economics 83, 63-75.  
 
Gabszewicz, J.J. and Turrini, A. (1999) ‘Workers’ Skills and Product Selection’ Revue Economique 50, 383-391. 
 
Gabszewicz, J.J. and Turrini, A. (2000) ‘Workers’ Skills, Product Quality and Industry Equilibrium’ International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 575-593. 
 
Gersbach, H. and Schmutzler, A. (2012) ‘Product Markets and Industry-Specific Training’ Rand Journal of 
Economics, 43,  475–491. 
 
Görlitz, K. and Stiebale, J. (2011) ‘The Impact of Product Market Competition on Employers’ Training Investments. 
Evidence from German Establishment Panel Data’ De Economist 159, 1-23.   
 
Green, F., Felstead, A., Gallie, D., Inanc, H. and Jewson, N. (2013) ‘What Has Been Happening to the Training of 
British Workers?’ Published by the Centre for Learning and Life Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies, 
LLAKES Research Paper 43. Accessed 29 November 2016.    
 
Green, F. and Zanchi, L. (1997) ‘Trends in the Training of Male and Female Workers in the United Kingdom’ 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 35, 635-644.  
 
Greene, W. H. (2001) ‘Estimating Econometric Models with Fixed Effects’ Discussion Paper, Department of 
Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University. 
 
Greene, W. H. and Henscher, D. A. (2010) Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Heywood, J.S., Pfister, A. and U. Jirjahn (2017) ‘Product Market Competition and Employer Provided Training in 
Germany’ Research Papers in Economics 2017-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics. 
 
Keesing, D.B. (1966) ‘Labor Skills and Comparative Advantage’ American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings 56, 249-258.  
 
Kersley, B., Alpin, C., Forth, J., Bryson, A., Bewley, H., Dix, G. and Oxenbrisge, S. (2006) Inside the Workplace: 
Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, Routledge, Oxford, UK.   
 
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. (1981) ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’ Journal of 
Political Economy 89, 615-641.   
 
Kranton, R. E. (2003) ‘Competition and the Incentive to Produce High Quality’ Economica 70, 385–404. 
 
Kugler, M. and Verhoogen, E.A. (2012) ‘Prices, Plant Size, and Product Quality’ Review of Economic Studies 79, 
307-339. 
 
Leuven, E. (2005) ‘The Economics of Private Sector Training: A Survey of the Literature’ Journal of Economic 
Surveys 19, 91-111.   
 
Lai, Tat-Kei. and Ng, T. (2014) ‘The Impact of Product Market Competition on Training Provision: Evidence from 
Canada’ Canadian Journal of Economics 47, 856-888. 
 
Leamer, E.E. (1984) Sources of International Comparative Advantage, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
   
Lynch L.M and Black, S.E. (1998) ‘Beyond the Incidence of Employer-Provided Training’ Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 52, 64 – 81. 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
36 
 
Matsa, D. A. (2011) ‘Competition and Product Quality in the Supermarket Industry’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
126, 1539–1591. 
 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1986) ‘Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality’ Journal of Political Economy 
94, 796-821.  
      
Nike, Inc. (2014) ‘Corporate Responsibility Report -Workers and Factories’  
http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/report/uploads/files/Nike_FY04_CR_report.pdf accessed August 25 2015. 
 
Oulton, N. (1996) Work Force Skills and Export Competitiveness In A. L. Booth and D. Snower (Eds.), Acquiring 
Skills. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Picchio, M. and Van ours, J. (2016). ‘Gender and the Effect of Working Hours on Firm-Sponsored Training’ Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization 125, 192 – 211. 
Picchio, M. and van Ours, J. (2011) ‘Market Imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training’ Labour Economics 18, 
712-722.   
 
Propper, C., Burgess, S. and Gossage, D. (2008) ‘Competition and Quality: Evidence From the NHS Internal Market 
1991-9’ Economic Journal 118, 138-170.   
 
Rogg, K.L., Schmidt, D. B., Shull, C. and Schmitt, N. (2001) ‘Human Resource Practices, Organizational  
Climate, and Customer Satisfaction’ Journal of Management 27, 431 – 49. 
 
Roy, S. and T. Sabarwal (2010) ‘Monotone Comparative Statics for Games with Strategic Substitutes’ Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 46, 793-806. 
 
Schott, P. K. (2004) ‘Across-Product versus Within-Product Specialization in International Trade’ Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 119, 647-678. 
 
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1982) ‘Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation’ Review of Economic 
Studies 49, 3-13. 
 
Shapiro, C. (1983) ‘Premiums for High Quality Products as Return on Reputation’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
98, 659-680. 
 
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984) ‘Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly’ RAND Journal of 
Economics 15, 546-554. 
 
Stevens, M. (1994) ‘A Theoretical Model of on-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition’ Oxford Economic 
Papers 46, 537-562.  
 
Stevens, M. (2001) ‘Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?’ Economic Journal 111, 485-505.  
 
Stock, J.H., Wright, J.H. and Yogo, M. (2002) ‘A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in 
Generalised Method of Moments’ Journal of Business and Economics Statistics 20, 518-539.  
 
Stock, J.H. and Yogo, M. (2005) ‘Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regressions’ in Identification and 
Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg, edited by Donald W.M. Andrews and 
James H. Stock. New York: Cambridge University Press.    
 
Stokey, N.L. (1991) ‘Human Capital, Product Quality, and Growth’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 587-616.  
 
Van Wanrooy, B., Bewley, H., Bryson, A., Forth, J., Freeth, S., Stokes, L. and Wood, S. (2013) The 2011 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey: First Findings. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
37 
 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210103/13-1010-WERS-first-findings-report-third-edition-may-2013.pdf 
accessed August 25 2015. 
 
Vives, X. (2008) ‘Innovation and Competitive Pressure’ Journal of Industrial Economics 56, 419-469.  
 
Webster, A. (1993) ‘The Skill and Higher Educational Content of UK Net Exports’ Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 55, 141-169. 
 
Wolinsky, A. (1983) ‘Prices as Signals of Product Quality’ Review of Economic Studies 50, 647-658. 
 
Zeithamal, V. (2000) ‘Service Quality, Profitability, and the Economic Worth of Customers: What We Know and 
What We Need to Learn’ Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 28, 67 – 85. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
38 
 Table 1. Quality Importance and Quality Sensitivity      
 
W
ER
S 2004 
W
ER
S 2011 
Panel 2004-2011 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
 
Strategic Plan 
K
eeps records 
Sets targets 
Strategic Plan 
K
eeps records 
Sets targets 
Strategic Plan 
K
eeps records 
Sets targets 
Q
uality im
portance 1 
0.754 
0.473 
0.382 
0.789 
0.521 
0.314 
0.784 
0.500 
0.500 
Q
uality im
portance 2 
0.811 
0.543 
0.536 
0.857 
0.558 
0.404 
0.831 
0.546 
0.542 
Q
uality im
portance 3 
0.863 
0.592 
0.540 
0.903 
0.650 
0.469 
0.895 
0.589 
0.558 
Q
uality im
portance 4 
0.914 
0.650 
0.547 
0.923 
0.723 
0.567 
0.909 
0.640 
0.573 
Q
uality im
portance 5 
0.929 
0.710 
0.615 
0.932 
0.778 
0.626 
0.930 
0.705 
0.661 
N
otes. In colum
ns 1, 4 and 7 the variable “strategic plan” takes the value of one if the establishm
ent has a strategic plan on im
proving quality product or service, zero otherw
ise. In colum
ns 2, 5 
and 8 the variable “keeps records” takes the value of one if the establishm
ent keeps records on the quality of product or service, zero otherw
ise. In colum
ns 3, 6 and 9, the variable “sets targets” 
takes the value of one if the establishm
ent sets targets on quality of product or service, zero otherw
ise. Entries are percents. They show
 the num
ber of ones for each variable in each quality 
im
portance category divided by the total num
ber of observations in the respective quality im
portance category. D
escriptive statistics of these three dum
m
y variables are reported in Table O
A
1 
in the on-line A
ppendix.  
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Table 2. Training Intensity and Quality Sensitivity - WERS 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
OLS 
Quality importance 2 0.025 0.065 0.024 0.058 0.081 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.145) (0.146) (0.199) 
Quality importance 3 0.052 0.072 0.043 0.062 0.085 
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.230) 
Quality importance 4 0.178** 0.170** 0.167** 0.183** 0.275** 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.112) 
Quality importance 5 0.214*** 0.213** 0.214** 0.228*** 0.310*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.114) 
% female employees -0.100 -0.040 -0.031 0.055 0.060 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.147) (0.156) (0.211) 
% part time employees -0.973*** -0.873*** -0.903*** -0.909*** -1.160*** 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.200) 
% 18 to 21 year old employees 0.505** 0.484** 0.508** 0.477** 0.566** 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.280) 
% over 50 year old employees -0.811*** -0.742*** -0.750*** -0.751*** -1.040*** 
 (0.170) (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) (0.231) 
Log number of employees  0.155*** 0.157*** 0.146*** 0.199*** 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.047) 
Single independent establishment  -0.385** -0.375** -0.310* -0.422* 
  (0.176) (0.177) (0.178) (0.242) 
Part of a larger organization  0.073 0.089 0.074 0.124 
  (0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.241) 
% union membership  0.300* 0.243 0.194 0.248 
  (0.156) (0.158) (0.159) (0.217) 
Few competitors   -0.180 -0.117 -0.161 
   (0.137) (0.138) (0.184) 
Many competitors   -0.286** -0.226* -0.314* 
   (0.134) (0.135) (0.179) 
Manager is male    0.060 0.090 
    (0.064) (0.087) 
Manager is the owner    -0.362*** -0.450*** 
    (0.090) (0.118) 
Cutoff 1 -1.141*** -0.706 -0.935* -0.897*  
 (0.415) (0.467) (0.482) (0.486)  
Cutoff 2 -0.935** -0.486 -0.715 -0.675  
 (0.415) (0.467) (0.482) (0.485)  
Cutoff 3 -0.339 0.138 -0.089 -0.044  
 (0.415) (0.467) (0.481) (0.485)  
Cutoff 4 0.445 0.941** 0.715 0.764  
 (0.415) (0.467) (0.481) (0.485)  
Cutoff 5 0.883** 1.377*** 1.152** 1.202**  
 (0.415) (0.468) (0.482) (0.486)  
Constant     2.469*** 
     (0.656) 
Observations 1554 1554 1554 1554 1554 
Log-likelihood -2422.883 -2378.902 -2375.708 -367.589  
R-squared     0.279 
Largest occupational group dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Manager characteristics No No No Yes Yes 
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: For information on the sample and on the variables of interest, see Notes in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  Since the dependent 
variable excludes establishments where the largest occupational group is managers/senior officials, we drop establishments where the largest 
occupational group is managers/senior officials and include seven dummies for the largest occupational group in the establishment (omitted 
category routine/unskilled).  The omitted category of product quality competition is ‘Quality Importance 1: Demand does not depend at all 
on product quality’. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The estimated coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 4’ and ‘Quality Importance 5’ in column 4 are significantly different from the 
estimated coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 2’ and ‘Quality Importance 3’, but are not statistically different from each other. Jointly, all 
‘Quality Importance’ coefficients are statistically different from zero (F-test=12.25, p-value=0.019). The cutoffs represent the threshold 
parameters associated with the ordinal nature of the dependent variable.        
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Table 3. Training Intensity and Quality Sensitivity - WERS 2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
OLS 
Quality importance 2 0.079 0.103 0.026 0.037 0.146 
 (0.175) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) (0.251) 
Quality importance 3 0.082 0.112 0.067 0.105 0.149 
 (0.172) (0.175) (0.175) (0.176) (0.245) 
Quality importance 4 0.194** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.352*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.116) 
Quality importance 5 0.257*** 0.282*** 0.295*** 0.305*** 0.460*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.118) 
% female employees -0.086 -0.035 -0.015 0.030 0.097 
 (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) (0.136) (0.190) 
% part time employees -0.528*** -0.430*** -0.421*** -0.405*** -0.591*** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.163) 
% 18 to 21 year old employees 0.245* 0.212 0.222 0.228 0.261 
 (0.137) (0.128) (0.239) (0.239) (0.335) 
% over 50 year old employees -0.300** -0.286* -0.306** -0.328** -0.477** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.202) 
Log number of employees  0.090*** 0.094*** 0.076** 0.127*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.048) 
Single independent establishment  -0.649*** -0.652*** -0.623*** -0.898*** 
  (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.267) 
Part of a larger organization  -0.224 -0.224 -0.265 -0.376 
  (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) (0.267) 
% union membership  0.321* 0.288 0.294 0.374 
  (0.184) (0.186) (0.187) (0.262) 
Few competitors   -0. 346* -0.343* -0.430* 
   (0.180) (0.181) (0.252) 
Many competitors   -0.508*** -0. 498*** -0.661*** 
   (0.178) (0.179) (0.250) 
Manager is male    0.054 0.102 
    (0.059) (0.083) 
Manager is the owner    -0.320*** -0.423*** 
    (0.084) (0.115) 
Cutoff 1 -0.785** -0.884** -1.213*** -1.302***  
 (0.382) (0.448) (0.469) (0.472)  
Cutoff 2 -0.612 -0.703 -1.030** -1.118**  
 (0.382) (0.448) (0.469) (0.471)  
Cutoff 3 -0.034 -0.108 -0.431 -0.517  
 (0.382) (0.448) (0.469) (0.471)  
Cutoff 4 0.799** 0.742* 0.421 0.337  
 (0.382) (0.448) (0.469) (0.471)  
Cutoff 5 1.373*** 1.321*** 1.002** 0.922*  
 (0.383) (0.448) (0.469) (0.471)  
Constant     2.904*** 
     (0.661) 
Observations 1688 1688 1688 1688 1688 
Log-likelihood -2724.538 -2686.782 -2680.051 -2672.612  
R-squared     0.168 
Largest occupational group dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Manager characteristics No No No Yes Yes 
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: For information on the sample and on the variables of interest, see Notes in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  Since the dependent variable excludes 
establishments where the largest occupational group is managers/senior officials, we drop establishments where the largest occupational group is 
managers/senior officials and include seven dummies for the largest occupational group in the establishment (omitted category routine/unskilled).  The omitted 
category of product quality competition is ‘Quality Importance 1: Demand does not depend at all on product quality’. Standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimated coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 4’ and ‘Quality 
Importance 5’ in column 4 are significantly different from the estimated coefficients of ‘Quality Importance 2’ and ‘Quality Importance 3’, but are not 
statistically significant different from each other. Jointly, all ‘Quality Importance’ coefficients are statistically different from zero (F-test=15.37, p-value=0.004). 
The cutoffs represent the threshold parameters associated with the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. 
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 Table 4. Training Intensity and Product Quality Sensitivity 
Panel Data Analysis 2004-2011 
 
Ordered Probit W
ithout 
FE 
OLS without FE 
Ordered Probit W
ith FE 
OLS with FE 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Q
uality Im
portance 2 
0.218 
0.337 
0.245 
0.434 
0.175 
0.256 
0.167 
0.268 
Q
uality Im
portance 3  
0.326 
0.243 
0.436 
0.318 
0.290 
0.338 
0.434 
0.327 
Q
uality Im
portance 4 
0.475** 
0.241 
0.621** 
0.314 
0.555** 
0.242 
0.697* 
0.419 
Q
uality Im
portance 5 
0.582** 
0.254 
0.791** 
0.332 
0.660*** 
0.245 
0.872** 
0.434 
Fixed Effects 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Log-likelihood 
 
-1313.032 
--- 
-1406.910 
--- 
R
-squared 
--- 
0.312 
--- 
0.703 
O
bservations  
878 
878 
878 
878 
W
orkforce com
position 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ccupational com
position 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Largest occupational group dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Firm
 characteristics 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
C
om
petition dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
M
anager characteristics 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Industry dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
R
egion dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
M
issing dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
N
otes: For inform
ation on the sam
ple and on the variables of interest, see N
otes in Tables A
1 and A
2 in the A
ppendix.  For reasons of brevity, w
e only present coefficients of the four variables 
of interest.  O
ther controls are those show
n in colum
n 4 of Tables 2 and 3 as w
ell as a year dum
m
y.  The rest of the estim
ates are available upon request. H
eteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors are reported across all specifications. The fixed effects ordered probit m
odel is estim
ated in LIM
D
EP. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, * *p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estim
ated coefficients 
of ‘Q
uality Im
portance 4’ and ‘Q
uality Im
portance 5’ in colum
n 1 are significantly different from
 the estim
ated coefficients of ‘Q
uality Im
portance 2’ and ‘Q
uality Im
portance 3’, but are not 
statistically different from
 each other. Jointly, all ‘Q
uality Im
portance’ coefficients are statistically different from
 zero (F-test=12.83, p-value=
0.003). “---” not relevant.     
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 Table 5. Training Intensity and Training for Quality and Other Types of Training 
Panel Data Analysis 2004-2011  
 
Quality Control Procedures 
Other Types of Training 
 
Ordered Probit 
W
ithout Firm FE
 
OLS W
ithout 
Firm FE 
OLS W
ith Firm 
FE
 
Ordered Probit 
W
ithout Firm FE
 
OLS W
ithout Firm 
FE
 
OLS W
ith Firm 
FE
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Q
uality Im
portance 2 
0.552* 
(0.318) 
0.577 
(0.376) 
0.567 
(0.495) 
0.604** 
(0.259) 
0.637** 
(0.300) 
0.794* 
(0.419) 
Q
uality Im
portance 3  
         0.689** 
         (0.305) 
0.698** 
(0.349) 
0.729 
(0.483) 
0.664** 
(0.260) 
0.739** 
(0.297) 
0.807* 
(0.422) 
Q
uality Im
portance 4 
0.719** 
(0.307) 
0.760** 
(0.362) 
0.877** 
(0.442) 
0.730*** 
(0.270) 
0.847*** 
(0.319) 
0.875** 
(0.440) 
Q
uality Im
portance 5 
0.964*** 
(0.369) 
1.114** 
(0.451) 
1.842*** 
(0.603) 
0.820** 
(0.337) 
0.947** 
(0.430) 
1.275** 
(0.582) 
Log-likelihood 
-1005.8 
--- 
--- 
-990.5 
-- 
--- 
R
-squared 
--- 
0.143 
0.613 
--- 
0.119 
0.593 
O
bservations  
878 
878 
878 
878 
878 
878 
W
orkforce com
position 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ccupational 
com
position 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Largest occupational 
group dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Firm
 characteristics 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
C
om
petition dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
M
anager characteristics 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Industry dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
R
egion dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
M
issing dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
N
otes: For inform
ation on the sam
ple and on the variables of interest, see N
otes in Tables A
1 and A
2 in the A
ppendix. For reasons of brevity, w
e only present coefficients of the four variables 
of interest. T
he om
itted category is “Q
uality Im
portance 1”. O
ther controls are those show
n in colum
n 4 of Tables 2 and 3 as w
ell as a year dum
m
y.  Estim
ates for the rest of the covariates are 
available upon request. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, * *p<0.05, * p<0.1. “---” not relevant.     
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Table 6. Keeping Perceived Quality Constant 
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004-2011 Panel 2004-2011 
 Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered  
Probit 
Ordered Probit with 
firm fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quality importance 2 0.022 
(0.167) 
0.056 
(0.178) 
0.125 
(0.338) 
0.089 
(0.256) 
Quality importance 3 0.031 
(0.146) 
0.168 
(0.177) 
0.370 
(0.246) 
0.141 
(0.248) 
Quality importance 4 0.156* 
(0.083) 
0.228*** 
(0.083) 
0.434* 
(0.243) 
0.238* 
(0.127) 
Quality importance 5 0.224*** 
(0.084) 
0.289*** 
(0.084) 
0.584** 
(0.257) 
0.327** 
(0.131) 
Quality product or service: about 
average for industry 
0.077 
(0.142) 
0.052 
(0.158) 
0.167 
(0.222) 
0.010 
(0.256) 
Quality product or service: better 
than average 
0.060 
(0.129) 
0.130 
(0.151) 
0.292 
(0.215) 
0.114 
(0.277) 
Quality product or service: a lot 
better than average for industry 
0.197 
(0.136) 
0.181 
(0.156) 
0.598*** 
(0.223) 
0.307 
(0.275) 
Log-likelihood -2365.9 -2668.7 -1304.6 -940.7 
Observations 1554 1688 878 878 
Notes. Other controls are those shown in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3. The “quality product or service” controls are dummy 
variables capturing if the quality of product or service are: “about average for industry”, “better than average for industry”, 
“a lot better than average for industry”. The omitted category is “below average for industry”. Due to the very small number 
of observations of the “a lot below average for industry” category in each of the three samples, we recoded those 
observations to the omitted category. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. The fixed effects 
ordered probit model is estimated in LIMDEP. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, * *p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 7. Training Intensity and Price Competition 
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004-2011  Panel 2004-2011 
 Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit with 
firm fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Price importance 2 -0.026 
(0.110) 
-0.035 
(0.089) 
-0.166 
(0.107) 
-0.101 
(0.170) 
Price importance 3 -0.046 
(0.103) 
-0.038 
(0.105) 
-0.275** 
(0.116) 
-0.156 
(0.198) 
Price importance 4 -0.178* 
(0.094) 
-0.093* 
(0.054) 
-0.300** 
(0.134) 
-0.345* 
(0.188) 
Price importance 5 -0.230** 
(0.108) 
-0.231** 
(0.101) 
-0.415*** 
(0.129) 
-0.493** 
(0.234) 
Log-likelihood -2348.3 -2668.2 -1229.0 -929.7 
Observations 1542 1684 874 874 
Notes. The price importance variables source from the following question: “Looking at the scale on this card, to what extent 
would you say that the demand for your (main) product or service depends upon offering lower prices than your 
competitors?” ranging from 1 (=demand does not depend at all on price) to 5(=demand depends heavily on offering lower 
prices). The omitted category is Price importance 1 (=demand does not depend at all on price). All the other controls are the 
same as those reported in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. 
The fixed effects ordered probit model is estimated in LIMDEP. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, * *p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 8. Panel A: Instrumental Variables (IV) Results-2004 
 First Stage Second 
Stage 
 Quality 
importance 2 
Quality 
importance 3 
Quality 
importance 4 
Quality 
importance 5 
Training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quality importance 2 --- --- --- --- 0.135 
(0.424) 
Quality importance 3 --- --- --- --- 0.163 
(0.158) 
Quality importance 4 --- --- --- --- 0.202*** 
(0.062) 
Quality importance 5 --- --- --- --- 0.244*** 
(0.085) 
Instrument for quality importance 2  4.721*** 
(0.792) 
-0.043 
(0.054) 
-0.168 
(0.243) 
-0.319 
(0.384) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 3 -0.136 
(0.086) 
6.553*** 
(0.715)   
-0.590 
(0.367) 
-0.442 
(0.350) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 4 -0.614 
(0.454) 
-0.386 
(0.235) 
20.340*** 
(3.949) 
-0.700 
(0.628) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 5 -0.198 
(0.199) 
-0.138 
(0.090) 
-0.059 
(0.180) 
8.544*** 
(1.584) 
--- 
Cragg-Donald eigenvalue statistic --- --- --- --- 40.221 
Observations 1554 1554 1554 1554 1554 
Notes. For reasons of brevity we only report estimates of the four main variables of interest and their respective instruments. Other controls 
include those shown in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3. Full estimates are available upon request. Standard errors clustered at workplace cells 
and heteroscedasticity corrected are reported in parentheses. Descriptive statistics of the instruments are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. “---” not available or relevant. 
 
 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables (IV) Results-2011 
 First Stage Second 
Stage 
 Quality 
importance 2 
Quality 
importance 3 
Quality 
importance 4 
Quality 
importance 5 
Training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quality importance 2 --- --- --- --- 0.099 
(0.374) 
Quality importance 3 --- --- --- --- 0.141 
(0.354) 
Quality importance 4 --- --- --- --- 0.342*** 
(0.101) 
Quality importance 5 --- --- --- --- 0.450*** 
(0.116) 
Instrument for quality importance 2  4.632*** 
(0.661) 
-0.063 
(0.066) 
-0.193 
(0.286) 
-0.486 
(0.456) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 3 -0.076 
(0.050) 
4.792*** 
(0.973) 
-0.130 
(0.420) 
-0.558 
(0.506) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 4 -0.382 
(0.247) 
-0.659 
(0.442) 
28.534*** 
(4.027) 
-4.063 
(2.844) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 5 -0.133** 
(0.091) 
-0.217 
(0.170) 
-0.043 
(0.304) 
9.734*** 
(1.045) 
--- 
Cragg-Donald eigenvalue statistic --- --- --- --- 60.425 
Observations 1688 1688 1688 1688 1688 
Notes. For reasons of brevity we only report estimates of the four main variables of interest and their respective instruments. Other controls 
include those shown in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3. Full estimates are available upon request. Standard errors clustered at workplace cells 
and heteroscedasticity corrected are reported in parentheses. Descriptive statistics of the instruments are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. “---” not available or relevant. 
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Panel C: Instrumental Variables (IV) Results -Panel 2004-2011(with establishment fixed effects) 
 First Stage Second 
Stage 
 Quality 
importance 2 
Quality 
importance 3 
Quality 
importance 4 
Quality 
importance 5 
Training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quality importance 2 ---  --- --- --- 0.148 
(0.119) 
Quality importance 3 --- --- --- --- 0.160 
(0.117) 
Quality importance 4 --- --- --- --- 0.169 
(0.122) 
Quality importance 5 --- --- --- --- 0.261** 
(0.112) 
Instrument for quality importance 2  9.174*** 
(2.176) 
-0.665 
(2.014) 
-0.578 
(0.923) 
-0.421 
(0.452) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 3 -0.842 
(0.929) 
23.613*** 
(8.121) 
-0.734 
(0.921) 
-0.296 
(0.863) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 4 -0.497 
(0.595) 
-0.884 
(1.762) 
3.003*** 
(0.796) 
-0.281 
(0.589) 
--- 
Instrument for quality importance 5 -0.488 
(0.604) 
-0.328 
(1.177) 
-0.335 
(0.277) 
1.755*** 
(0.612) 
--- 
Cragg-Donald eigenvalue statistic --- --- --- --- 25.350 
Observations 878 878 878 878 878 
Notes. For reasons of brevity we only report estimates of the four main variables of interest and their respective instruments. Other controls 
include those shown in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3, plus a year dummy and establishment fixed effects. Full estimates are available upon 
request. Standard errors clustered at workplace cells and heteroscedasticity corrected are reported in parentheses. Descriptive statistics of the 
instruments are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. “---” not available or 
relevant. 
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Appendix Tables 
 Table A1. Distribution of Training Intensity 
N
otes: The sam
ples for the tw
o cross sections consist of trading sector establishm
ents w
ith 5 or m
ore em
ployees that provide their goods and services to the general public and/or to other 
organizations.  W
e exclude establishm
ents w
here the largest occupational group is m
anagers or senior officials as the dependent variable does not apply to this group.  For the panel dataset  
w
e apply the sam
e restrictions as in the tw
o cross sections and keep establishm
ents observed tw
ice. Thus, the panel is balanced and w
e observe 439 establishm
ents w
hich generate 878 
observations. S
tandard errors for proportions are used. T
he training intensity question reads as follow
s: “On average, how many days of training did experienced employees in the largest non-
managerial occupational group undertake over the past 12 months?” E
stablishm
ents that offered no training w
ere coded “No time”.          
  Table A2. Distribution of Demand Dependence on Product Quality 
 
W
ERS 2004 
W
ERS 2011 
W
ERS Panel 2004-2011 
 
M
ean 
Std. Error. 
Obs. 
M
ean 
Error. 
Obs. 
M
ean 
Error. 
Obs. 
1: Demand does not depend at all on quality  
0.049 
0.005 
76 
0.034 
0.004 
57 
0.034 
0.006 
30 
2:  
0.036 
0.004 
56 
0.031 
0.004 
52 
0.038 
0.006 
33 
3:  
0.140 
0.008 
218 
0.134 
0.008 
226 
0.140 
0.012 
123 
4:  
0.342 
0.012 
531 
0.372 
0.012 
628 
0.347 
0.016 
305 
5: Demand depends heavily on superior quality 
0.433 
0.013 
673 
0.430 
0.012 
725 
0.441 
0.017 
387 
Total Observations 
1554 
1688 
878 
N
otes: For inform
ation on the sam
ple, see N
otes in Table A
1. Standard errors for proportions are used. The question of dem
and dependence on product quality reads as follow
s “To what extent 
would you say that the demand for your (main) product or service depends upon you offering better quality than your competitors? 
  
W
ERS 2004 
W
ERS 2011 
W
ERS Panel 2004-2011 
 
M
ean 
Std. Error. 
Obs. 
M
ean 
Std. Error. 
Obs. 
M
ean 
Std. Error. 
Obs. 
No time 
0.134 
0.008 
209 
0.120 
0.008 
203 
0.145 
0.012 
127 
Less than one day 
0.064 
0.006 
100 
0.054 
0.005 
91 
0.055 
0.008 
48 
1 to less than 2 days 
0.206 
0.010 
320 
0.226 
0.010 
381 
0.223 
0.014 
196 
2 to less than 5 days 
0.321 
0.012 
499 
0.332 
0.011 
561 
0.326 
0.016 
286 
5 to less than 10 days 
0.136 
0.009 
212 
0.159 
0.009 
269 
0.148 
0.012 
130 
10 days or more 
0.138 
0.009 
214 
0.108 
0.008 
183 
0.104 
0.010 
91 
Total Observations 
1554 
1688 
878 
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Table A3. Relationship between Sensitivity of Demand to Product Quality and Number of    
                 Competitors, WERS 2011    
 Sensitivity of demand to product quality 
Structural competition “1” “2” “3” “4” “5” 
No competitors 0.439 0.077 0.048 0.024 0.023 
Few competitors (<=5) 0.245 0.269 0.352 0.408 0.364 
Many competitors 0.326 0.654 0.600 0.568 0.613 
Notes. Entries in the cells show the share of observations in each of the five responsiveness categories of quality indicators with 
respect to the total number of observations in each of the three structural competition categories. For instance, “1” displays the 
share of observations for those managers who replied “Demand does not depend at all on product quality” in each of the three 
structural competition categories, to “5” that displays the share of observations for those managers who replied “Demand depends 
heavily on superior quality” in each of the three structural competition categories. Shares sum-up to 100 vertically. Similar 
relationships between sensitivity of demand to product quality and number of competitors exist in the WERS 2004 and are 
available upon request.        
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 On-line Appendix  
We now allow for asymmetry by assuming that firm i faces a marginal cost ic  with 1 2c c  (i.e. 
firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2). In this case, we get the following Bertrand equilibrium 
prices, quantities and profits in the second-stage pricing game: 
2
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )( , , ) ,  ,  ( )
4 2 4 2
B
ij i j ij i jB B B i
i i i i
Y s s Z s s qp q g IO OS EE J E J E J E J E
§   ·§ ·   ¨ ¸¨ ¸   © ¹© ¹
             (A1) 
where  2 2(2 ) (2 ) , (2 ) (2 )ij i j ij i jY c c Z c cD E J E E J D E J E J EJ{    {      
In stage one, the firms’ reaction functions now become: 
2 2
2( ; )
(2 ) 2 2
ij
i j j
ZI I IOEO OG E J EO E J
§ ·  ¨ ¸  © ¹
                           (A2) 
Solving this system yields the asymmetric equilibrium in training investments: 
2
*
2 2 2
2 ( )2
(2 ) (2 ) (2 ) 4
ij ji
i ij
Z ZI Z EOEOG E J E J G E J EO
ª º « »   « »¬ ¼
                          (A3) 
Since 12 21Z Z!  we immediately get * *1 2I I! , i.e. the efficient firm provides more training and 
therefore offers a superior brand quality than the inefficient one.16 Our primary interest lies in the 
investigation of the relationship between *iI  and λ, which depends on the relative strength of the 
positive direct effect and the negative strategic effect (as explained in the body of the article). 
For this purpose, we derive: 
                                                 
16 We also require 
12 21 21( ) /Z Z ZG Gt  to ensure that 
*
2 0I t . 
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2 2 2 4*
22 2 2
2 ( ) 3 (2 ) 4 82
(2 ) (2 ) (2 ) 4
ij jii
ij
Z ZI Z
E O G E J EO EOE
O G E J E J G E J EO
­ ½ª º   w ° °¬ ¼ ® ¾w   ª º ° °¬ ¼¯ ¿
             (A4) 
This expression is unequivocally positive for firm 1 ( *1 / 0I Ow w ! ) showing that any increase in 
the demand sensitivity to quality always strengthens the efficient firm’s training incentives. For 
the inefficient firm, however, the overall impact of λ on *2I  can be either positive or negative. 
This ambiguity can be illustrated by use of a numerical example with parameter values 1D  ,
0.5E  , 0.25J  , 1 1c  , 2 2c  and 8G  . Then, (A3) implies: 
2
*
1 2
8 0.5625( ) 1.0625
75 12.5 2
I O OO O
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
                            (A5) 
2
*
2 2
8 0.5625( ) 0.5
75 12.5 2
I O OO O
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
                           (A6) 
where [0,2]O  to ensure that *2 0I t . The relationship between training and λ for firms 1 and 2 is 
graphically depicted in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The curve *1 ( )I O is increasing for all values 
of λ, whereas the curve *2 ( )I O has an inverse-U shape reflecting the tradeoff between the direct 
and the strategic effect of λ on the inefficient firm’s training incentives. For low values of λ, the 
direct effect dominates and thus the overall impact of λ on *2I  is positive. For high values of λ, 
the strategic effect dominates and the relationship between λ and *2I  becomes negative. These 
findings show that even under asymmetry we can identify a parameter range in which firms 
engage in more intensive training as the demand for their product becomes more sensitive to 
relative quality, thus providing further motivation to our empirical testing. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between 
λ and training for the efficient firm. 
Figure 2. The relationship between 
λ and training for the inefficient 
firm. 
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Table OA1. Descriptive Statistics of All the Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 204-2011 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean 
Std. 
dev. Mean Std. dev. 
% female employees 0.458 0.296 0.471 0.286 0.493 0.295 
% part time employees 0.265 0.287 0.265 0.279 0.291 0.283 
% of employees 18-21 years old 0.087 0.130 0.071 0.115 0.083 0.121 
% of employees over 50 years old 0.193 0.160 0.230 0.172 0.217 0.159 
% of managers 0.104 0.090 0.114 0.095 0.095 0.080 
% of professional staff 0.072 0.162 0.114 0.201 0.086 0.163 
% of technical staff 0.081 0.165 0.088 0.178 0.074 0.155 
% of sales staff 0.189 0.308 0.146 0.276 0.182 0.306 
% of operative and assembly manual staff 0.114 0.232 0.095 0.224 0.104 0.230 
% of clerical/secretarial staff 0.126 0.190 0.116 0.163 0.103 0.159 
% of craft and skilled manual staff 0.089 0.187 0.082 0.177 0.076 0.156 
% of personal service staff 0.067 0.211 0.098 0.251 0.122 0.276 
Largest occupational group: Professional 0.082 0.274 0.094 0.292 0.072 0.258 
Largest occupational group: Associate professional 0.097 0.296 0.088 0.283 0.075 0.264 
Largest occupational group: Administrative 0.106 0.308 0.097 0.296 0.083 0.276 
Largest occupational group: Skilled trades 0.086 0.281 0.118 0.323 0.154 0.361 
Largest occupational group: Caring, leisure 0.218 0.413 0.174 0.379 0.211 0.408 
Largest occupational group: Sales 0.163 0.370 0.121 0.326 0.145 0.352 
Largest occupational group: Process, operative 0.172 0.377 0.174 0.379 0.170 0.376 
Manufacturing 0.180 0.384 0.137 0.344 0.147 0.354 
Utilities (electricity, gas, water) 0.025 0.156 0.027 0.161 0.032 0.176 
Construction 0.054 0.226 0.044 0.206 0.030 0.170 
Wholesale 0.192 0.394 0.155 0.362 0.185 0.388 
Hotels and restaurants 0.069 0.253 0.092 0.289 0.091 0.288 
Transport and communication 0.082 0.275 0.082 0.275 0.105 0.306 
Financial services 0.072 0.259 0.024 0.154 0.040 0.196 
Other business services 0.148 0.355 0.163 0.369 0.109 0.312 
Education 0.028 0.166 0.061 0.239 0.038 0.190 
Health 0.089 0.285 0.117 0.322 0.149 0.356 
North East 0.044 0.205 0.056 0.229 0.042 0.201 
North West 0.118 0.323 0.113 0.317 0.131 0.338 
East Midlands 0.075 0.264 0.062 0.241 0.080 0.271 
West Midlands 0.109 0.312 0.079 0.270 0.091 0.288 
East Anglia 0.042 0.200 0.043 0.202 0.046 0.209 
South East 0.320 0.467 0.334 0.472 0.326 0.469 
South West 0.081 0.273 0.088 0.284 0.077 0.267 
Wales 0.041 0.199 0.042 0.201 0.048 0.214 
Scotland 0.083 0.276 0.098 0.298 0.093 0.291 
Log number of employees 4.200 1.665 4.069 1.653 4.330 1.607 
Single independent establishment 0.290 0.454 0.323 0.468 0.210 0.407 
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Continued 
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 204-2011 
 Mean Std. dev. Mean 
Std. 
dev. Mean Std. dev. 
 
Few competitors 0.369 0.483 0.370 0.483 0.385 0.487 
Many competitors 0.571 0.495 0.587 0.493 0.563 0.496 
Part of a larger organization 0.683 0.466 0.649 0.477 0.759 0.428 
% union membership 0.185 0.289 0.146 0.257 0.168 0.281 
Respondent manager is the owner 0.078 0.268 0.072 0.258 0.062 0.240 
Dummy for missing percentage 18-21 years old 0.023 0.148 0.020 0.141 0.034 0.182 
Dummy for missing percentage over 50 years old 0.020 0.140 0.021 0.143 0.032 0.176 
Dummy for missing percentage union membership 0.019 0.138 0.033 0.179 0.117 0.322 
Instrument for quality importance 1 0.011 0.029 0.008 0.029 0.008 0.035 
Instrument for quality importance 2 0.009 0.024 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.034 
Instrument for quality importance 3 0.049 0.079 0.036 0.064 0.049 0.116 
Instrument for quality importance 4 0.087 0.071 0.095 0.075 0.092 0.084 
Instrument for quality importance 5 0.107 0.063 0.105 0.057 0.114 0.090 
Computing skills 0.015 0.121 0.012 0.109 0.010 0.100 
Team working 0.001 0.027 0.005 0.072 0.001 0.035 
Communication skills 0.004 0.066 0.008 0.089 0.012 0.112 
Leadership skills 0.008 0.090 0.008 0.089 0.011 0.106 
Operation of new equipment 0.028 0.166 0.021 0.144 0.019 0.137 
Customer service/liaison 0.051 0.221 0.035 0.184 0.038 0.191 
Health and safety 0.238 0.426 0.204 0.403 0.218 0.413 
Problem-solving methods 0.034 0.182 0.031 0.174 0.020 0.141 
Equal opportunities 0.063 0.243 0.115 0.319 0.089 0.285 
Reliability and working to deadlines 0.062 0.242 0.044 0.206 0.053 0.225 
Quality control procedures 0.463 0.498 0.469 0.499 0.491 0.500 
None of these skills 0.031 0.172 0.045 0.208 0.034 0.182 
Strategic plan 0.524 0.499 0.589 0.491 0.631 0.483 
Keeps records 0.517 0.499 0.621 0.485 0.565 0.496 
Sets targets 0.402 0.490 0.416 0.493 0.471 0.499 
Price competition 1 0.164 0.370 0.144 0.352 0.150 0.357 
Price competition 2 0.127 0.333 0.112 0.314 0.108 0.310 
Price competition 3 0.302 0.459 0.321 0.466 0.322 0.467 
Price competition 4 0.215 0.411 0.232 0.422 0.238 0.426 
Price competition 5 0.192 0.394 0.190 0.392 0.181 0.385 
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations for each variable reported for the two cross sections and the panel samples. Means  
are weighted using establishment weights.  Means for variables with missing observations are estimated on non-missing observations.   
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Table OA2. Robustness Check Table – Controlling for Average Education Level in the Establishment   
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 
 (1) (2) 
Quality importance 2 0.025 
(0.169) 
0.035 
(0.194) 
Quality importance 3 0.087 
(0.180) 
0.126 
(0.209) 
Quality importance 4 0.200** 
(0.099) 
0.268*** 
(0.093) 
Quality importance 5 0.222** 
(0.101) 
0.308*** 
(0.092) 
% of employees with GCSE (grades D-G) 0.127 
(0.262) 
0.145 
(0.272) 
% of employees with GCSE (grades A-C) 0.304 
(0.209) 
0.206 
(0.200) 
% of employees with A levels 0.402 
(0.265) 
0.282 
(0.299) 
% of employees with first degree (BSc, BA) 0.616** 
(0.287) 
0.445* 
(0.249) 
% of employees with higher degree (MSc, MA, PhD) 0.842* 
(0.479) 
0.704** 
(0.340) 
% of employees with other academic qualifications 0.091 
(0.195) 
0.109 
(0.225) 
Log-likelihood -1735.986 -1819.759 
Observations  1149 1178 
Workforce composition Yes Yes 
Occupational composition Yes Yes 
Largest occupational group dummies Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Competition dummies Yes Yes 
Manager characteristics Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes 
Missing dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: The estimation method is an ordered probit model. Column 1(2) replicates column 4 of Table 2(3) in the main paper and 
adds six continuous variables capturing the average education level of employees in the establishment (omitted category: 
percentage of employees with no academic qualifications). Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. 
Levels of significance:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
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 Table OA3. M
arginal Effects of Quality Importance on Training based on Column 4 of Tables 3 and 4 
 
W
ERS 2004 
W
ERS 2011 
 
Quality 
Importance 2 
Quality  
Importance 3 
Quality  
Importance 4 
Quality  
Importance 5 
Quality  
Importance 2 
Quality  
Importance 3 
Quality  
Importance 4 
Quality  
Importance 5 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Training 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
Coef. 
Std. E. 
       x = 0 
-0.017 
0.042 
0.004 
0.051 
-0.054** 
0.024 
-0.066*** 
0.024 
-0.010 
0.048 
-0.028 
0.044 
-0.071*** 
0.022 
-0.082*** 
0.021 
0 < x < 1  
-0.003 
0.007 
0.001 
0.007 
-0.008** 
0.003 
-0.011*** 
0.004 
-0.002 
0.008 
-0.004 
0.008 
-0.011*** 
0.004 
-0.013*** 
0.004 
1 ≤ x < 2 
-0.003 
0.008 
0.001 
0.007 
-0.009** 
0.004 
-0.013** 
0.005 
-0.003 
0.015 
-0.009 
0.017 
-0.020*** 
0.007 
-0.026*** 
0.008 
2 ≤ x < 5 
0.007 
0.017 
-0.002 
0.022 
0.024** 
0.010 
0.028*** 
0.009 
0.004 
0.018 
0.009 
0.014 
0.026*** 
0.008 
0.029*** 
0.008 
5 ≤ x < 10 
0.006 
0.015 
-0.001 
0.017 
0.019** 
0.008 
0.024*** 
0.008 
0.005 
0.024 
0.014 
0.024 
0.035*** 
0.011 
0.042*** 
0.011 
     x ≥ 10  
0.009 
0.025 
-0.002 
0.026 
0.030** 
0.014 
0.039*** 
0.015 
0.006 
0.028 
0.017 
0.030 
0.040*** 
0.014 
0.050*** 
0.014 
   N
otes: 1. x denotes num
ber of days devoted to training;  
              2. Entries are m
arginal effects obtained from
 an ordered probit m
odel based on the com
plete estim
ates m
odel (i.e. colum
n 4 of Table 2 (W
ER
S 2004) and Table 3 (W
ER
S 2011)    
                  respectively). They are com
puted at the m
ean of continuous variables and at zero for dum
m
y variables.  
              3. W
e only report the m
arginal effects of the four variables of interest. M
arginal effects for the rest of the covariates are available upon request.  
              4. Robust standard errors are reported. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table OA4. Robustness Check Table - Interval Regression   
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004-2011 Panel 2004-2011 
with FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quality importance 2 0.147 
(0.445) 
0.201 
(0.551) 
0.147 
(0.540) 
0.269 
(0.576) 
Quality importance 3 0.468 
(0.515) 
0.503 
(0.551) 
0.574 
(0.650) 
0.616 
(0.831) 
Quality importance 4 0.855*** 
(0.249) 
0.756*** 
(0.251) 
0.898** 
(0.383) 
0.792* 
(0.406) 
Quality importance 5 0.891*** 
(0.255) 
0.820*** 
(0.247) 
0.952** 
(0.403) 
0.827** 
(0.411) 
Log-likelihood -4155.65 -4409.865 -2320.184 -1910.340 
Observations  1554 1688 878 878 
Workforce composition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Largest occupational group 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: For reasons of brevity, we only present coefficients of the four variables of interest.  Other controls are those shown 
in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 in the main paper, as well as a year dummy in columns 3 and 4.  The rest of the estimates are 
available upon request. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. Levels of significance:  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table OA5. Training Intensity and Product Quality by Type of Training  
Ordered Probit 
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quality control 
procedures training 
Other types of 
training 
Quality control 
procedures training 
Other types of 
training 
Quality importance 2 0.331 
(0.204) 
0.243 
(0.189) 
0.014 
(0.199) 
0.232 
(0.207) 
Quality importance 3 0.393** 
(0.193) 
0.267 
(0.179) 
0.097 
(0.206) 
0.279 
(0.250) 
Quality importance 4 0.432** 
(0.189) 
0.325** 
(0.164) 
0.176** 
(0.087) 
0.378** 
(0.188) 
Quality importance 5 0.575** 
(0.256) 
0.570** 
(0.220) 
0.192** 
(0.096) 
0.410** 
(0.199) 
Log-likelihood -1396.1 -1879.2 -1934.8 -2205.8 
Observations 1554 1554 1688 1688 
Workforce composition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational 
composition 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Largest occupational 
group dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Missing Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes. For information on the sample and on the variables of interest, see Notes in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix of the 
paper.  Other types of training include: “computing skills”, “team working”, “communication skills”, “leadership skills”, 
“operation of new equipment”, “customer service/liaison”, “health and safety”, “problem solving methods”, “equal 
opportunities”, “reliability and working to deadlines”, plus “none of these”. Both “quality control” procedures and “other 
types” of training are recoded to zero if “none of these” equals to one. Other controls are those shown in column 4 of Tables 
2 and 3 in the paper. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, 
* *p<0.05, * p<0.1. Descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Table OA1 in the online Appendix. 
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Table OA6. Second Stage Instrumental Variable Interval Regression (IV) Results  
 WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Training Training Training 
Quality importance 2 0.161 
(0.123) 
0.114 
(0.099) 
0.174 
(0.154) 
Quality importance 3 0.175 
(0.114) 
0.152 
(0.125) 
0.201* 
(0.114) 
Quality importance 4 0.257** 
(0.109) 
0.315** 
(0.123) 
0.308** 
(0.155) 
Quality importance 5 0.362*** 
(0.114) 
0.458*** 
(0.152) 
0.377** 
(0.149) 
Sigma 1.59 1.29 0.99 
Wald test 20.812 16.438 18.838 
Wald test P value 0.00156 0.00248 0.00018 
Notes. The estimation method is an IV interval regression model implemented using a Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood Model (LIML) as proposed by Bettin and Luchetti (2011). The estimation is performed in Gretl. Standard errors 
are clustered at workplace cells and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. We report estimates only for the four main variables 
of interest. Other controls include those shown in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 in the main paper, plus a year dummy in 
column 3. Full estimates are available upon request. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
